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Abstract 
The determination of optimal fines to deter the formation or continuation of cartels is a major 
objective of competition policy. We provide an analysis of static and dynamic frameworks to 
characterize the restitution and deterrence properties of fines: cartel stability depends on their 
ability to prevent deviation by firms, while the benefit of a deviation depends on the fines to 
be imposed in case of detection by the antitrust authority. We show that the proper 
consideration of the dynamics of competition has a major impact on the determination of 
optimal dissuasive fines: our results suggest that a clear majority of fines imposed by the 
European Commission in recent years meet the deterrence objective. 
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1.  Introduction 
We are concerned in this paper with the determination of optimal fines to deter the formation 
of cartels and, if they are formed, to favour their collapse through firms’ deviation from cartel 
agreements. Antitrust authorities rely mainly on financial penalties to enforce laws against cartels.1 
The economic theory of crime has shown that fines may fail to be deterrent or to be restitutive, thus 
failing to reduce the social harm caused by cartels. Yet excessive fines may also induce a social cost, 
by raising too much the intensity of incentives to find and prosecute cartels, thereby increasing the 
cost of antitrust resources  and raising the cost and probability of type I errors, that is, finding guilty 
innocent parties.2 We discuss the optimal level of fines in cartel cases in line with the objectives of 
antitrust policy, and compare this level to the actual level of fines imposed by antitrust authorities. Our  
results suggest that a clear majority of recent fines imposed by the European Commission satisfies the 
dissuasive objective.  
A cartel is a group of independent firms which collectively agree to coordinate their supply, 
pricing or other policies in order to make larger profits than they would in a market where “natural 
competition” prevails. Firms typically collude only if the price increase they can implement (the 
“overcharge”) generates a net incremental payoff (the “excess profit”) that is more than sufficient to 
cover the cartel costs. Cartels pursue their goals at the expense of customers’ interests and well-being, 
and as such, are harmful for society. Most advanced economies consider therefore cartels as illegal.  
The United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) recommend the imposition of a base fine of 
10% of the affected volume of commerce to a firm convicted of cartel collusion plus another 10% for 
the harms inflicted upon consumers. As this amount may undergo some adjustments for aggravating 
and mitigating factors, the total fine typically ranges from 15% to 80% of affected sales. The amount 
of fines imposed to convicted cartels has dramatically increased in recent years, from 889 millions $ 
over the period 2000-2004 to 3.4 billion $ over the period 2005-2009.3 
In the European Union, the amount of the fine takes into account the severity of the damages 
inflicted upon consumers as well as some aggravating and mitigating factors. However, the total fine 
must not exceed 10% of the total annual turnover of an undertaking, which may be much larger than 
                                                            
1 A number of countries have adopted criminal sanctions against individuals who engaged in hardcore cartels 
(for example, the US, Canada and Japan), but only a few countries within Europe (principally Austria, Norway, 
Ireland, the United Kingdom and, in relation to bid-rigging, Germany). 
2 The modeling of games involving predator and prey or police and criminals must rely on mixed strategies in 
order to avoid bang bang phenomena and carry forward the idea that it is illusive and too costly to eradicate all 
crimes in society. For such an approach see Boyer, Lewis and Liu (2000). Contrary to opinions often heard, the 
optimal level of crime in society is not zero: under an optimally designed antitrust policy (including both 
financial sanctions on corporations and individuals as well as personal sanctions such as debarment and prison 
terms for individuals), cartels will continue to be formed and maintained not because of firm myopia or error but 
because some of those cartels remain profitable. See Ginsburg and Wright (2010) and Harrington (2010) on 
these issues. 
3 U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division. 
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the affected sales. The amount of fines imposed to convicted cartels has also dramatically increased in 
recent years, from 293 million € over the period 1995-1999 to 3.5 billion € over the period 2000-2004 
to 9.8 billion € over the period 2005-2009.4  
It may be useful to recall the definition of a restitution fine as opposed to a dissuasive fine. 
The restitution fine is the fine that permits to seize back the illegal profits realized by a particular 
cartel. The restitution fines collected from all cartels may not be restitutive at the aggregate level 
because some cartels will disappear before being discovered or may remain undiscovered forever. The 
proper dissuasive fine level is that level which makes unprofitable the formation of a cartel or 
unsustainable its continuation. Firms are deterred from participating in cartels if the expected net 
incremental profit from participating in the cartel is negative. Hence the viewpoint taken in 
characterizing dissuasive fines is that of the cartel itself, more precisely that of the firms in the cartels. 
Each individual firm must determine if participating in the cartel will generate a net increase in profits 
sufficient to cover the expected fine, when compared with the no cartel or but-for situation. It must 
also decide, when the cartel has been in effect for some time, if continuing to abide by the cartel 
agreement is more profitable than deviating from it. 
One of the driving factor behind the increases in fines is the desire to make the fines 
dissuasive and not only restitutive. Indeed, the 2006 Guidelines indicate very clearly the importance of 
the dissuation objective in setting the fines:5 
Point 4. The Commission's power to impose fines … is one of the means … to carry 
out the task of supervision entrusted to it by the Treaty. That task not only includes 
the duty to investigate and sanction individual infringements, but it also 
encompasses the duty to pursue a general policy designed to apply, in competition 
matters, the principles laid down by the Treaty and to steer the conduct of 
undertakings in the light of those principles. For this purpose, the Commission must 
ensure that its action has the necessary deterrent effect … not only in order to 
sanction the undertakings concerned (specific deterrence) but also in order to deter 
other undertakings from engaging in, or continuing, behaviour that is contrary to 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (general deterrence) [italics added].6 
The economic theory of dissuasion of criminal activities relies on two main approaches, which 
both proceed from the theory of deterrence of criminal activities developed by Becker (1968) and 
                                                            
4 European Commission, Directorate General of Competition. For a statistical review of the evolution of fines 
over the 1998-2006 period, see Veljanovski (2010).  
5 European Commission, “Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of 
Regulation No 1/2003 (2006/C 210/02)”. See also the Communiqué issued by the French Autorité de la 
Concurrence launching the public consultation on Antitrust fines (Communiqué of January 17 2011, in particular 
paragraphs 41 and 42).  
6 The Guidelines stress the dissuasive property of fines in many other Points: 7, 25, 30, 31, 37 among others.  
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Landes (1983). One approach puts an emphasis on the restitution of criminal gains and the proper 
compensation of victims. The golden rule of this approach asserts that the fine should be equal to the 
harm that criminal activities have caused to society (including the costs incurred for finding and 
prosecuting criminals) divided by the probability of detection and conviction. To make sure the total 
restitution fines collected is in line with the total value of the harm caused, one needs to use a long 
term probability of detection concept. However, basing fines on a case-by-case estimation of damages 
would be costly.7 Implicit in the Becker-Landes paradigm is the belief that not all crimes can or should 
be deterred.  
In contrast, the second approach directly addresses the dissuasion of criminal activities: 
punishment should be such that criminal activities are unprofitable. This optimal deterrence approach 
relies therefore on the idea that, for a given probability of detection, the fine should be high enough to 
wipe out any expected profit from the infringement. The first approach focuses on the recuperation of 
illicit profits and the compensation of harmed victims while the second one considers the impact of 
penalties on the profitability of engaging in illicit activities. 
Surprisingly, the large economic literature on cartels8 has not devoted much space to the 
assessment of the effectiveness of current antitrust practices. Most of the applied literature reviewed in 
Connor and Bolotova (2006) deals with the estimation of cartel overcharges, leaving open the actual 
determination of the optimal fines. However, after collecting and examining a larger data set, Connor 
(2010) concludes that "...penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels ought to be 
increased".  Combe and Monnier (2010) consider 64 recently prosecuted cartel cases in the EU and 
contribute to filling the gap between evaluating cartel overcharges giving rise to illicit gains and 
defining and computing “optimal” restitutive and dissuasive fine benchmarks, in part directly from the 
court evidence and in part based on Connor’s reviews of cartel overcharges. They use the latter 
benchmarks to gauge the actual fines inflicted to the 64 cartels they considered. From their theoretical 
analysis and empirical estimates, they concluded that "fines imposed against cartels by the European 
Commission are overall sub optimal". 
About two decades before, Cohen and Scheffman (1989) expressed a different viewpoint. 
They were among the first to overtly criticize the US antitrust policy (more precisely the 1989 
Guidelines) at a time where the level of fines was quite modest compared to recent years. They argued 
that the estimation of damages by the antitrust authorities was not economically grounded: the antitrust 
authorities did not properly take into account the reaction of customers to a price increase (through the 
price elasticity of demand) and thus "the Justice Department's assertion that price-fixing conspiracies 
would typically result in a mark-up over competitive level of ten percent […] is not supported by the 
                                                            
7 See for instance OXERA (2009). 
8 See Motta (2004). 
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available evidence. […] This conclusion has important implications because of the potential 
inefficiencies that may arise from overdeterrence" (page 349). Recently, Connor (2011) aknowledges 
that, following the 2006 Guidelines, increases in fine levels imposed on cartels by the European 
Commission make recent fines confiscatory in many cases: “For the first time in antitrust history, I 
believe we are observing fines that regularly disgorge the monopoly profits accumulated by cartelists” 
and “The new Guidelines produced hard-core cartel fines that were more than six times as severe as 
comparable fines imposed under the 1998 Guidelines.” 
Boyer and Kotchoni (2011), using an updated Connor database, note that the Connor data are 
overcharge estimates rather than true observations and therefore subject to model error, estimation 
error and publication bias. Once controlling for the asymmetry (skewness), heterogeneity, publication 
bias, as well as the presence of a small number of influential observations (outliers) in the data, they 
conduct a meta-analysis of cartel overcharge estimates in the spirit of Connor and Bolotova (2006). 
They find that the mean bias-corrected overcharge estimate for cartels with raw positive overcharge 
estimates under 50% (the bulk of cartel cases) is 13.6% with a median of 13.6%, while the mean for 
all cartels of all types is 17.5% with a median of 14.1%. They argue that median values are in this case 
more informative and reliable as representative of cartel overcharge and that those values must be 
considered as upper bounds (given their conservative assumptions).  
In this paper, we review the process to design dissuasive fines from cartel overcharges. We 
highlight the role of a crucial modeling factor, which is swept under the rug in many contributions, 
namely the dynamic dimension in the strategic behavior of firms (or cartels). Indeed, the issue of cartel 
stability and the role of fine in deterring the formation of cartels must be analyzed in a dynamic 
framework. We will show that the proper and explicit consideration of such a dynamic framework, 
together with the determination of representative overcharge estimates properly corrected for model 
errors, estimation errors and publication bias, have a major impact on the determination of optimal 
dissuasive fines: the restitutive and dissuasive benchmarks measured by Combe and Monnier (2010) 
should be reduced by factors no smaller than two and ten respectively. This suggests that, considering 
the sample of cartels studied by Combe and Monnier, approximately two thirds of the fines imposed 
are above the properly defined restitutive benchmark and at least half of them are above the properly 
defined dissuasive benchmark. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the general 
methodology to define the economic benchmarks that we use to assess the deterrent character of actual 
fines. This methodology is then formalized in two contexts: in a static framework (Section 3) and in a 
dynamic framework (Section 4). We revisit the Combe and Monnier results in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes, putting the choice of fines as part of a more general set of policy intruments.   
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2.  Economic Benchmarks for Cartel Fines 
The general methodology to obtain economic benchmarks for the determination of restitutive 
and dissuasive fines in cartel cases is sketched in Table 1.  
Table 1: Methodology to determine economic benchmarks for cartel fines 
Step  To be estimated 
1 Overcharge Price increase 
versus but-for price 
2 Excess profit Competitive mark-up 
Price elasticity 
3-1 Restitution fine Cartel duration 
3-2 Dissuasive fine Probability of detection 
 
Step 1 refers to the price overcharge due to cartelization. It is defined as the percent increase 
over the price that would prevail in the absence of a cartel, known as the “but-for price”. This price is 
usually assessed through various methods such as: before and after methods, yardstick methods, cost 
based methods, econometric models. Step 2 aims to estimate the excess (or illicit) profit realized by 
the cartel over and above the natural competition level. Here, one needs to introduce notions such as 
the competitive mark-up, i.e. the competitive price over the marginal cost, and the demand elasticity. 
Step 3-1 aims to estimate the restitution fine. This may be done by first assessing the (average) annual 
excess or illegal profit of the cartel and multiplying it by the duration of the cartel. The dissuasive fine 
is obtained at step 3-2 by combining excess profits and the probability of detection in ways we discuss 
below. Clearly, there is disagreement among analysts regarding the best or better way to model and 
measure excess profits and the probability of detection and conviction. As mentioned in the 
introduction, antitrust authorities are currently aiming more to meet a dissuasion objective than a 
restitution one. 
To formalize the restitutive and dissuasive fine benchmarks in an economic framework, we 
must embed the analysis in a model of competition. The competition model may be static or dynamic. 
Static models of competition are simpler and are often used as short-cuts, but they may be misleading 
if the relevant stakes reside in the dynamic nature of the strategic interaction between the players or 
firms. Dynamic models of competition are more realistic, but they are also more complex and 
therefore, more subject to ad hoc assumptions. Moreover, dynamic models tend to be plagued by a 
multiplicity of equilibria.  
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Whatever the economic framework used, it is important to remember that industry 
characteristics play a significant role in determining the economic model of competition, and these 
characteristics must be accounted for in empirical works. If empirical observations suggest that a 
Bertrand-type competition (i.e. price competition with a homogenous good) prevails in an industry, 
then the competitive equilibrium price (which becomes the but-for price if a cartel is formed) is close 
to the marginal cost of production. If evidence suggests that a Cournot-type competition (i.e. quantity 
competition with a homogenous product) or a monopolistic competition (i.e. price or quantity 
competition with differentiated products) prevails, then the equilibrium price(s) may be significantly 
higher than marginal cost(s) of production, in particular if the market is concentrated.  
The industry concentration may be due to structural exogenous factors such as scarcity of 
some inputs, location, first-movers advantage, etc., which may explain or justify positive economic 
profits (but of course the excess profits due to cartelization are not). The concentration may also be 
due to endogenous factors such as large advertising budgets, R&D expenses, and significant fixed 
investments, all factors which give rise to sunk costs that can only be indirectly recovered and should 
be taken into account in the assessment of average costs. 
In some circumstances, it may be appropriate to go one step further in complexity in designing 
an economic model of competition compatible with the presence of risk and uncertainty as well as 
dynamic factors such as business cycles, investment decisions, set up costs, capacity constraints, etc., 
which may have a strong influence in the evolving market structure.  
In dynamic models, special attention should be given to situations in which, due to the 
characteristics of the industry, the competition between firms may give rise to non cooperative long 
term equilibria that mimic collusive outcomes (the so-called “tacit collusion equilibria”). According to 
Ivaldi et al. (2003), the likelihood of observing a non cooperative equilibrium that mimics a collusive 
outcome9 is higher when there are fewer competitors, demand is less volatile, innovation is lower, 
costs and/or production capacities are similar across firms, entry barriers are more important, firms 
interact more frequently, the market is more transparent (knowledge of prices and output), and demand 
growth is more important. 
For clarity of exposition, we will first formalize the economic benchmarks using the much 
simpler static framework. We will then show how these benchmarks should be reconsidered in a more 
realistic dynamic perspective. 
 
                                                            
9 See also Bernheim and Whinston (1990), Rothschild, (1999), and Verboven (1997). 
 
8 
 
3. Defining the Benchmarks in a Static Framework 
The market power of a firm may be defined as its ability to influence the market outcome to its 
own advantage. More often than not, firms’ market power translates into the difference between actual 
prices and the prices that would prevail in pure and perfect competition. Indeed, in pure and perfect 
competition, both the sellers and buyers are price-takers. No player believes that his or her actions can 
influence the equilibrium price. At the other extreme, a monopoly (a single seller or a single buyer) 
grants a firm with the highest possible market power. Between these two extremes, there are various 
forms and levels of competition that may grant firms with little market power (Bertrand) or mild to 
severe forms of market power (Cournot, monopolistic competition). In assessing the illegal profit 
accruing to cartels, a major challenge resides not only in the determination of the market power that 
the firms would exert absent the cartel, but also in the evaluation of the impact of price changes on 
demand.  
3.1. The standard approach 
A standard way to define the benchmarks in a static framework is summarized in Sidebar 1 
taken from Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007).10 It shows that the excess profit depends on three main 
parameters, namely the price increase due to the cartel, the price elasticity of demand, and the 
competitive mark-up, and it indicates how the restitutive and dissuasive benchmarks can be 
characterized.11  
The following graph illustrates the basic intuitions behind the determination of the excess 
profit. The profit of the firm in a competitive market is the area consisting of B+C = (p-c)q. If a cartel 
is formed, the profit becomes A+B = (pm-c)qm. The excess profit is thus A-C. 
                                                            
10 See also Werden and Simon (1987), Gallo et al. (1994) among others, and more recently Combe and Monnier 
(2010). 
11 One must be careful in using such a tool as the parameters ε (price elasticity of demand), m (competitive mark-
up and k (cartel price overcharge) are not independent: both m and k depend on ε (the price elasticity of demand 
is an important determinant of market power in a market), and a larger m will in general imply a lower k (if the 
competitive mark-up is already high, the cartel overcharge will tend to be lower). 
9 
 
 
The game tree depicted in Figure 1 shows the different decisions and possibilities facing firms. 
Either they do not form a cartel (nc), in which case they enjoy a profit level of π (the but-for profit), or 
they do form a cartel (c) in which case they face two possibilities, namely not being caught and 
enjoying profit level πm, a possibility whose probability of occurrence is (1-α), or the possibility of 
being detected and convicted and suffering a fine of fS and thus a drop in profit to πm - fS, a possibility 
whose probability of occurrence is α. 
Figure 1: The decision tree for cartel formation in a static framework 
   
 
 
 
α 
1 − α 
c 
nc 
πm - fS
πm
π
Price
Cartel price: pm  = p(1+k) -----------------------------------------------
but‐for price: p = c(1+m) --------------------------------------------------------------
c --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Marginal cost
Demand
qm Quantityq
A
B C
D
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Sidebar1: Illicit profits, restitution fines and dissuasive fines as a % of sales 
The method presented below is referred to by Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) as the traditional 
approach to compute the restitutive and dissuasive fine benchmarks. It uses the following variables: 
 
p  is the competitive price (the “but-for” price); 
c  is the marginal cost (assumed constant); 
m  is the competitive mark-up m = (p – c)/c 
k  is the percentage price increase due to the cartel: the cartel price is pm = p(1+k)   
q  is the quantity demanded at the competitive price; 
ε  is the absolute value of the demand elasticity at the competitive price; 
qm is the quantity demanded at the cartel price, ; qm = q(1 – ε k) 
α  is the probability of detection of the cartel; 
f  is the fine expressed as a fraction of the firms’ revenue in the affected market. 
 
Absent the cartel, each firm’s profit is π = q(p-c)=qcm   
 
In the cartel, each colluding firm’s profit is  
 
πm = qm(pm – c) = qc(1 – εk)(m + k +mk) 
 
Therefore a colluding firm increases its profits by: 
 
Δπ = πm – π = qkc((1 + m)(1 -  εk) – εm) 
 
Sales (noted S) in the market at the colluding price are: 
 
S = qmpm = qc(1 + m)(1 + k)(1 –εk) 
 
The excess profit as a percentage of sales is 
 
Δπ / S = k[(1 + m)(1 -  εk) – εm]/[(1 + m)(1 + k)(1 –εk)]        (*) 
 
Observe that if m or ε are zero this expression reduces to k / (k+1). 
 
The restitution fine as a percentage of cartel sales, denoted F, is directly 
 
 F = Δπ / S 
 
Denote by α that the probability of detection and by f the dissuasive fine as a percentage of cartel sales. 
If the industry cartelizes each member of the cartel will get its cartel profit πm. The cartel will be 
detected with probability α. If the industry does not cartelize each firm gets its competitive profit π.  
Figure 2 depicts the corresponding decision tree. The fine is dissuasive if and only if  
 
πm - α f S  ≤  π  that is if and only if  f  ≥  (Δπ / S)/α. 
 
Clearly, a larger probability of detection (through a leniency program, for instance) would justify a 
lower dissuasive fine.   
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Note that in this static framework, the excess profit and the probability of detection are defined 
for the same cartel duration, whatever that duration is. Suppose that the cartel duration is known to be 
n years and that the probability of detection per year is constant and equal to α1, the overall n-year 
probability of detection is equal to αn = 1 – (1 - α1)n.12 With Δπ / S being the cartel annual excess profit 
as a percentage of affected sales, the n-year benchmark for the dissuasive fine is given by the 
following, henceforth the “overall n-year static dissuasive fine”: 
f = n(Δπ /S)/αn 
As pointed out by Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007), this static approach is not satisfactory in 
all respects.13 They suggested that a better definition of the optimal fine must account for the fact that 
the stability of a cartel depends on the incentives of each member to abide by the cartel agreement. 
Indeed, cartels are subject to defection by any member who wishes either to benefit by cutting the 
cartel price, or to benefit from a leniency program, or both. The presence of a leniency program that 
ensures that the deviant firm is not fined increases the probability of detection and conviction and 
hence, cartels can be deterred with a (significantly) lower fine than the optimal fine prescribed by the 
previous static approach.14 In Section 4, we formalize these ideas in the context of a dynamic strategic 
game. 
The procedure presented in Sidebar 1 is simple to understand. However, besides the (often 
neglected) interdependency of the parameters discussed above,15 its application to derive numerical 
benchmarks requires that the various parameters be estimated. In light of this economic model, two 
examples of pitfalls to avoid in assessing the overcharge (or parameter k in sidebar 1) are discussed 
next. The first one concerns yardstick methods (and also applies to before and after methods), and the 
second one refers to the use of the Lerner index as an indicator of the market power and price 
overcharge of the cartel.  
                                                            
12 The period over which Δπ and α are defined is usually one year, but one could consider alternative periods 
such as six months, 18 months, and n years. The values of Δπ and α must of course be adjusted accordingly. 
Suppose that the values of Δπ and α have been defined for a period of one year. The adjustment of Δπ for the 
alternative periods would simply be ½Δπ, 1.5Δπ, and nΔπ. For α, the adjustment is a bit more complex. Consider 
a period of three years. Since α is defined as the probability of detection over one year, the corresponding 
probability of detection over three years must be: α + α(1 - α) + α(1 - α)2 = 1 – (1 - α)3. For a n-year cartel, the n-
year probability of detection is 1 – (1 - α)n.   
13 Surprisingly, relatively few authors have analyzed this question in a dynamic framework. In a static 
framework, Souam (2001) compares the efficiency of two different regimes of fines against cartels when 
antitrust authorities have limited resource: the first one involves fines based on the industry’s total sales, while 
the second involves fines based on damages incurred by consumers. Souam shows that the second regime has 
better deterrence properties if and only if market conditions make collusion very likely. 
14 Besides noting that leniency programs would allow a reduction in dissuasive fines, Buccirossi and Spagnolo 
claim that “… considering our initial simulation [an overcharge of 10%], a cartel with five members in a market 
whose competitive mark-up is 0 could be deterred by imposing a fine on non-reporting firms equal to less than 
2% of the firms’ affected commerce over the entire duration of the cartel and paying a reward to the 
whistleblower equal to the collected fine.” 
15 See footnote 11. 
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3.2. Potential pitfalls in using yardstick methods 
Yardstick methods are often used to determine but-for environments. Here we stress the 
importance of using that type of methods only when the market conditions are similar in order to avoid 
errors in the estimation of damages. In particular, we show that if an equilibrium price of a comparable 
market with no cartel is used as a but-for price estimate (the yardstick), then the differences in demand 
price elasticity between the two markets must be known for the yardstick methods to be effective. If 
the price elasticity of demand is higher in the yardstick market, the equilibrium price will be lower 
than the but-for price that would have prevailed in the market. Hence, there would be an 
overestimation of damages.16 
Consider for instance a static and symmetric Cournot duopoly framework.17 The price 
elasticity of demand  and the Cournot equilibrium price are related: 
MCPC ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−= 5.0ε
ε ,        (1) 
where  is the marginal cost (supposed constant).. For example, assume that good A is sold in 
regions 1 and 2.  Symmetric Cournot duopolies operate in both markets, but the distance between the 
two markets is such that region 1 firms cannot compete with region 2 firms. Moreover, suppose that in 
region 2 a non-perfect substitute for good A is available which causes the price elasticity of demand to 
be higher in region 2 than in region 1.  Suppose also that marginal costs are constant and identical in 
both regions ( ) and that, for regions 1 and 2, the price elasticity of demand is constant 
and equal to 1 and 1.50 respectively.  According to (1), we have the following Cournot equilibrium 
prices (  in region 1 and  in region 2): 1 12CP MC=
 
and 2 21.5CP MC= .  
Suppose now that the firms in region 1 are accused of a price fixing collusion which was active during 
a given period, and that during the same period, region 2 has remained competitive à la Cournot.  To 
compute the damages caused by the cartel, a straightforward and intuitive candidate “but-for” price 
                                                            
16 The price elasticity of demand is the measure of the sensitivity of the quantity demanded relative to a change 
in price.  For example, a 1% price increase followed by a 2% drop in quantity demanded implies a price 
elasticity of demand equal to (negative) 2.  A high price elasticity of demand suggests that consumers are easily 
able to find substitutes for the good of interest whose price has increased.  Hence, higher elasticity of demand 
implies lower market power and lower prices in markets characterized by both oligopoly and monopoly. 
Therefore, the mark-up over marginal costs that the monopolist and firms in the Cournot duopoly can exert is 
decreasing with the price elasticity of demand (e.g., the higher the elasticity, the lower the mark-up). 
17 See for instance Borenstein, Bushnell and Knittel (1997).  
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could be the price observed in region 2 during the cartel period.  However, the Cournot equilibrium 
price in region 1 should always be higher than in region 2.  If we take the ratio of  and , we 
obtain 1.33 and consequently, using the price in region 2 as a “but-for” price estimate would lead to an 
improper assessment of damages, in this case an overestimation of damages.18 
Despite the fact that the static Cournot duopoly framework is a crude simplification of reality, 
it still gives interesting insights on the features to consider when assessing the validity of a “but-for” 
price. Depending on the chosen “but-for” price estimation methodology, the above type of analysis 
can give an indication of the plausibility of the difference between the observed cartel price and the 
“but-for” price. This type of analysis also gives an indication as to the features to consider when 
assessing the suitability of the data used to come up with a counterfactual.   
Industry characteristics play a significant role in determining the theoretical but-for-price, and 
these characteristics should be accounted for in any serious empirical assessment. To put it differently 
any attempt to use one of the pure empirical methods to estimate the but-for-price should incorporate 
an explicit economic theory of competition. 
3.3. Potential pitfalls in using the Lerner index as a short-cut of the cartel market power 
Sidebar 1 describes a methodology to derive the excess profit from the cartel overcharge, the 
competitive mark-up and the demand elasticity. Recall that if the competitive mark-up is assumed to 
be zero, then the excess profit as a percentage of sales can be directly taken as k / (k+1), where k is the 
cartel overcharge.19 In that case, k / (k+1) = (pm – c ) / pm which is the well known Lerner index, the 
cartel price over the marginal cost divided by the cartel price. In the special case in which the but-for 
price is taken as the marginal cost (m = 0), the Lerner index corresponds exactly to the excess profit as 
a percentage of cartel sales. This provides a handy but slippery short-cut to define benchmarks. 
In Connor (2006), the overcharges displayed in Table 12, 12A, 12B are inferred from Lerner 
indices previously estimated by Bernheim (2002).20 The average overcharge inferred by Connor is 
above 40%, a high percentage potentially attribuable to the propensity of the calculation method used 
to overstate the true excess profit. In the following citation, Connor (2007) seems to acknowledge that 
the but-for price should reflect the true conditions prevailing before the cartel formation: “A pre-cartel 
price is often presumed in legal settings to be the competitive price. ‘Cartel members ... enjoy no 
presumption that they already had market power before the illegal act was committed’ (Hovenkamp, 
1998:660). However, even if a pre-cartel period was arguably one of oligopolistic tacit pricing 
                                                            
18 Equivalently, in the same constant price elasticity of demand framework, if marginal costs are not identical in 
both regions, Cournot equilibrium prices will also differ as a direct consequence of equation (1) and using the 
price in region 2 as a but-for price estimate could again lead to an improper statement of damages.   
19 However, the value of k and therefore k / (1 + k) are not independent of the price elasticity of demand,  
20 As quoted by Connor (2006). 
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conduct, the pre-cartel price is still a reasonable benchmark so long as the competitive determinants 
of pricing conduct did not change when the cartel was formed." 
 Also, in Connor (2010, footnote 3) it is mentioned that: "...The benchmark may be the purely 
competitive price, or it may be a somewhat higher price generated by legal tacit collusion by 
companies in an oligopolistic industry". However, footnote 47 casts some doubt on how he actually 
interprets the overcharges estimated from the Lerner index in subsequent analyses: "...The Lerner 
Index is the same as the overcharge, except that it is measured by dividing [the difference between] 
the market price [and the marginal cost] by the monopoly price instead of the competitive price". 
To illustrate the danger of overstating the excess profit when using such a short-cut, we 
compare the excess profit that would prevail using a simple model of imperfect price competition with 
differentiated products (see sidebar 2) to the excess profit based on the Lerner index. The related Table 
2 provides two sets of calculations. Consider first the “Lerner Index” column with a cartel price 
overcharge of k = 30%, a but-for price equal to marginal cost, a competitive mark up m = 0 and a 
Lerner index L = (pm – c) /pm equal to k / (1 + k) = 23%, which is the excess profit as a percentage of 
sales. The analysis is different if competition moves away from pure Bertrand competition (with a but-
for price equal to marginal cost) because firms differentiate their products, allowing a competitive 
mark up above zero. We present a simple model of competition with product differentiation in sidebar 
2 and the estimated excess profit in Table 2. The corresponding excess profit could drop from 23% to 
a value in the interval 16% to 10% as shown in Table 2 (the cross elasticity is declining as the 
production differentiation increases). As we stressed above, the cartel price overcharge and the 
competitive markup are interdependent values since a higher competitive markup implies a lower 
cartel overcharge as the cartel will never charge more than the monopoly price.  
However, the inverse relation between the competitive mark up and the cartel overcharge has 
no effect on the Lerner index since this index refers directly to the marginal cost. Table 2 shows that if 
the Lerner index is used (column “Lerner index”) when the competitive markup m is not 0, the cartel 
excess profit is overstated, in this example by a factor ranging from 150% to 230%. This directly 
translates into overstatements of both the restitution fine and the dissuasive fine benchmarks. 
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Sidebar 2: The Bertrand competition model with differentiated products 
 
A widely used framework to model price competition model with differentiated products is the one 
proposed by Shubik (1980). We use the version of this model specified in Demange and Ponssard 
(1985). 
 
There are 2 firms, each one producing a differentiated product.  
Marginal costs of production for the firms are identical and constant at c.  
The demand function qi for firm i is (with pi and pj standing for the price selected by the two firms): 
 
                                            qi = 1 – bpi + ω(pj - pi ) 
 
It is characterized by two parameters b and ω. The parameter b is related to the aggregate market price 
elasticity and the parameter ω is related to the degree of differentiation of the products (technically, 
since we are using linear demand functions and not iso-elastic ones, the price elasticity is not constant; 
it depends on the two selected prices; see the numerical calibration below). 
                                             
This model can be solved to obtain the competitive outcome p = pj = pi (i.e. the Bertrand Nash 
equilibrium) and the cartel outcome pm (taken as the monopoly equilibrium for simplicity, which is an 
upper bound on the effect of a cartel).21  
For completeness we give the analytical expressions of these two outcomes. 
The competitive price is 
p* = [2(ω +b) + a + 2(ω +b)2c + ω (ω +b)c]/[4(ω +b)2 – ω 2] 
The cartel (monopoly) price is 
pm = (1 + bc)/(1 + b) 
The numerical values used in the simulation to obtain the results displayed in Table 2 are the 
following ones. The constant marginal cost c is taken as 1.6, the parameter b is taken as .25, and the 
degrees of differentiation ω used to generate the cartel overcharge (20%, 15% and 13%) are given in 
the table.  
The local price elasticity as the prices changes from p* to pm is defined as ε = - [(qm-q*)/q*]/[(pm-
p*)/p*]. Observe in Table 2 that it is almost constant as ω varies. 
  
                                                            
21 Indeed, Block, Nold and Sidak (1981) show that “a cartel's optimal price is likely to be neither the competitive 
price nor the price that the cartel would set in the absence of antitrust enforcement but rather an intermediate 
price that depends on the levels of antitrust enforcement efforts and penalties.” Their empirical results “reveal 
that increasing antitrust enforcement in the presence of a credible threat of large damage awards has the 
deterrent effect of reducing markups in the bread industry.” 
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Table 2: Comparing the Lerner index short-cut and a formal economic model 
Parameters 
Lerner 
index 
Imperfect price competition with 
differentiated products 
degree of differentiation ω Irrelevant  4  2,4  2 
cartel overcharge k  30%  20%  15%  13% 
competitive mark up m  0%  8%  13%  15% 
local price elasticity ε  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.9 
Estimated Excess profit as 
a percentage of sales 
23%  16%  12%  10% 
overstatement  factor 
when  wrongly using the 
Lerner index 
1.0  1.5  2.0  2.3 
 
4. Defining the Benchmarks in a Dynamic Framework 
Cartels operate in a dynamic environment and this should be accounted for in their analysis. 
As shown below, the analysis of the but-for environment as well as of cartels internal stability is much 
more complicated in a dynamic framework.  
4.1 The but-for environment in a dynamic framework 
It is well known that dynamic market interactions may yield higher prices than the static 
competitive prices.22 Economic theory defines “tacit collusion” outcomes as the set of non-cooperative 
market outcomes that can be attained absent explicit collusion, i.e. without explicit agreements 
between firms, but mimicking collusive outcomes. For instance, Ivaldi et al. (2003) define tacit 
collusion as follows:  “Tacit collusion need not involve any ‘collusion’ in the legal sense, and in 
particular need involve no communication between parties. It is referred to as tacit collusion only 
because the outcome (in terms of prices set or quantities produced, for example) may well resemble 
that of explicit collusion or even an official cartel.” When assessing the “but-for” price, one must 
therefore be aware of the possibility that tacit collusion equilibrium occurs, which, legally, is not anti-
competitive.  
The microeconomic analysis of non-cooperative competitive market outcomes in a dynamic 
framework relies on two main sets of models: repeated games and Markov games. The first strand of 
that literature considers that dynamic interactions can be interpreted as the repetition of a static 
competition game. Following Friedman (1971), the “folk theorems” state that in such repeated games, 
the set of competitive prices may range from the repetition of competitive outcomes to the monopoly 
                                                            
22 See for instance Motta (2004), chap. 4. 
17 
 
price (depending in part on the firms’ patience).23  This approach relies on the idea that prices above 
the static competitive price can be the “natural” outcome of non-cooperative strategic interactions 
when firms realize that lowering the given price would be followed by a price war that would wipe out 
any further profit: if firms are patient enough, the prospect of losing all further profits (the 
“punishment”) dominates the incentives for a short term price reduction (the “deviation”). The 
emergence of such equilibria is favored by the existence of some conditions (e.g. complete 
information on the demand functions and the cost structures, a small number of firms, relatively 
homogenous products...) In some cases, these conditions would make the consideration of the Folk 
theorems unavoidable. In other cases, one may consider that these theorems do not apply and that the 
static equilibrium provides a satisfactory representation of the but-for-world.24  
The repeated game framework lacks important features to properly characterize industry 
equilibria in the presence of demand growth and volatility, potential entry, and capacity constraints. In 
the long run, industry structure is determined by the investment strategies of the firms, in particular by 
the existence of exogenous or endogenous sunk costs and their implications for entry and exit of 
players (Tirole 1988, Sutton 1991).25 Hence, when assessing the but-for-price, it may be necessary to 
revisit some basic structural factors underlying the current industry situation. For instance, it may be 
the case that a more intense competition would lead to a more concentrated industry. Moreover, a 
more concentrated industry does not necessarily imply higher market power for firms (Sutton, 1991).26  
The second strand of the literature has designed suitable conceptual tools to deal with issues in 
dynamic games that cannot be interpreted as repetitions of static games. Baumol, Panzar and Willig 
(1982) introduced the notion of contestable markets to explain why, though the number of firms on a 
market may be small, the market outcomes may still be competitive due to the threat of entry. Similar 
developments can also be used to formalize the creative destruction process imagined by Schumpeter 
through which the most efficient firm emerges as the dominant firm until it is replaced by an even 
more efficient one.27 The complexity of the competition process in such dynamic games can be 
illustrated through the Boyer, Lasserre and Moreaux (2011) model for investments in capacity in a 
                                                            
23 Technically, the “folk theorems” apply to games with infinite horizon, that is, indefinitely repeated; however, 
the result extends to market interactions are repeated over a period long enough for each firm to ignore the date 
of its exiting the market. Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), for instance extend this result to more realistic 
frameworks with incomplete information. 
24 This is the view taken in Phlips (1995). This will be the line of thought that will be followed in the next 
section to characterize the role of fines as deterrent of cartel formation. Observe that this is a conservative view 
in the sense that it tends to underestimate the but-for price. 
25 For instance, the interaction between demand volatility and industry capacity in a dynamic context is subtle. 
Consider two firms producing their Cournot equilibrium quantity with no capacity to spare. If a shift in demand 
occurs such that quantity demanded increases at all price levels, the firms will invest to increase their production 
capacity. In the meantime, even absent collusive agreement, both firms supply the market given their production 
capacity, which is below their unconstrained Cournot equilibrium quantity, and the firms thus exert some market 
power above the level that existed before the increase in demand.  
26 See D’Aspremont and Motta (2000). 
27 See also Ponssard (1991) and Gromb, Ponssard and Sevy (1997). 
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homogeneous product duopoly facing uncertain demand growth.28 Using the concept of Markov 
Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) introduced and characterized by Maskin and Tirole (1988), they show that 
equilibirum paths of the investment game may include both preemption (strong competition) episodes 
and “tacit collusion” episodes (with higher prices) as natural, non cooperative, competitive episodes. 
Hence, dynamic but-for price and investment patterns may very well be mimicking collusive-like 
patterns in the absence of cartel behavior, even in homogenous product markets (particularly favorable 
to strong competition outcomes), and especially in markets or industries with high demand volatility, 
high market growth and low cost of capital.29  
These theoretical developments are also playing an increasingly important role in applied 
industry models. The trend of such applications originated from the work of Erickson and Pakes 
(1995) who provides a methodology to design realistic models in which the industry structure evolves 
over time under endogenous entry and exit due to various shocks in the demand or cost functions. 
4.2 Internal cartel stability in a dynamic environment 
As outlined previously, the natural competition price in a dynamic setting can mimic any type 
of static equilibrium. For example, when a price war prevails, the natural competition price will be 
quite close to the marginal cost of production. Also, a tacit collusion equilibrium can drive the price up 
to its monopoly level. Finally, Cournot-type competition has the potential to generate any price level 
in between. In analyzing the stability of cartels below, we adopt the conservative approach which 
consists of assuming that the competitive outcome of a dynamic strategic interaction mimics the 
repetition of the competitive outcomes static strategic interaction. 
The characteristics of antitrust policy, and in particular the design of fines, obviously influence 
cartel stability. In Sidebar 3, we analyze cartel stability by introducing a risk of defection as well as a 
risk of punishment by antitrust authorities. We consider a hypothetical industry where a given number 
of firms set up a cartel. In each period, there is an exogenous annual probability of detection α of the 
cartel;30 the firms may either follow the cartel strategy or deviate. If the cartel is detected, the cartel is 
dissolved and each firm pays a fine H in monetary terms (not in percentage), assumed constant over 
time. For each firm, we denote the one-period cartel profit as Mπ , the one-period deviation profit as 
                                                            
28 In that model, capacity building is achieved through the addition of production units that are durable and 
lumpy and whose cost is mainly irreversible. While building their capacity over time, firms compete à la Cournot 
in the product market. 
29 Technically, these conditions increase the discount factor expressed in state space, which in a sense is 
reminiscent of the role of a high value of δ in repeated games (see Sidebar 3 below). 
30 Harrington (2004) considers a situation where the probability of cartel detection (and conviction) increases 
with the magnitude of price changes: bigger price movements are more likely to trigger suspicions and thus 
detection of the cartel. When the probability of detection is sufficiently sensitive to price increases, the cartel 
gradually raises price. If, in addition, detection is sufficiently sensitive to price decreases, then deviations are 
prevented as a sudden price war would trigger suspicion.  
 
19 
 
Dπ  and the one-period but-for competitive profit as π .31 Deviation makes sense only if D Mπ π> , a 
sensible condition. Following the industrial organization repeated game approach to cartel formation 
and stability (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986; Tirole 1988), we assume that the interactions are repeated 
over a large (infinite) number of periods and that all firms have the same discount factor δ. We focus 
on trigger strategies: each player plays the cartel strategy as long as no player has deviated previously; 
if a cartel member deviates from that strategy at some time, all players play the but-for competitive 
strategy from then on. If the fine is larger than the dynamic dissuasive fine characterized in Sidebar 3, 
then at least one firm will deviate from the cartel agreement and thereby trigger a chain reaction of 
deviations leading to the dismantling of the cartel.  
Figure 2 provides a representation of the game tree related to Sidebar 3. The cartel members 
continue to get the cartel profit as long as no member deviates and the cartel is not detected. As soon 
as one of these two conditions no longer prevails, each firm is back to the but-for profit. A low value 
of the fine H (or the probability of detection α) makes defection less attractive (as long as the cartel 
members are patient), even if the members are aware that the cartel will eventually be detected. 
Increasing H (or α) reduces the stability of the cartel: the fear of defection deters the formation or 
maintenance of a cartel. 
Figure 2: The game tree for cartel formation in a dynamic framework 
 
  
                                                            
31 Deviation without detection by the authorities implies no antitrust penalty.  
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1 − α 
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Sidebar 3: Minimal deterrent fine in a dynamic environment 
Consider a firm’s incentives to deviate at some time, given that all other players play the trigger 
strategy. If the firm plays the cartel strategy, its discounted profit or its value MV  is: 
( )
1( ) (1 )
1                   (1 ) ( ( ) ...)
1
M
M M
M
H
V H
H
δπ α πδ δπ α π α δ δδ α δ π α πδ
⎡ ⎤+ − + +⎢ ⎥−= + − + + − ⎢ ⎥− ⎢ ⎥− + − + +⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
 
           
( )
1
1 (1 )
M H δπ α πδ
δ α
+ − + −= − −  
If the firm deviates (and all firms play their competitive strategy thereafter), its value DV is   
     
1
D DV δπ πδ= + −  
The fine H will be dissuasive if the firm prefers to deviate, that is if  
     
(1 ) (1 (1 ))M DD MV V H π δ α π π δ αα
− − − − −> ⇔ >
 
 
A sufficient condition for the fine to be dissuasive is that it hinders collusion in the most difficult case 
of infinitely patient firms ( ) and very low deviation profit ( 1
D Mπ π υ= +  where 1υ  is positive 
but arbitrarily small. This condition is equivalent to (with Mπ π πΔ = − ): 
1
(1 )H α π υα
−= Δ +  
Or, expressed as a percentage of annual sales S: 
( )(1 ) /DH S f Sα πα
−= = Δ  
 
 
Hence, a fine slightly larger than (1 ) /α α−  times the annual incremental cartel profit deters 
the formation or maintenance of a cartel, whatever its duration.32 We refer to this fine as the “dynamic 
dissuasive fine”. For instance, if the annual probability of detection is estimated at 15%, a fine equal to 
5.7 times the annual incremental profit is dissuasive even under the most pessimistic or difficult 
                                                            
32 Note that, even absent internal stability problems, a necessary condition for a cartel to be profitable is that the 
expected profit of each firm is higher than the competitive profit, that is, given the notations of sidebar 3, 
M Hπ α π− > . This implies that a fine ( ) /MH π π α> −  will be deterrent at any time, and in any condition. 
This fine is independent of the duration of the cartel. 
δ = 1
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conditions (very patient firms, low value of deviation); that is, if the net annual incremental profit is 
7% of sales, then a fine of 40% of annual affected sales would be dissuasive. 
Note that the formula we obtain for the dynamic dissuasive fine differs from the static 
dissuasive fine obtained in Sidebar 1. In particular, the dynamic dissuasive fine is equal to the static 
dissuasive fine minus Δπ /S. The excess profit and probability of detection are defined on the same 
period, but this period need not be the duration of the cartel. A fine above the dynamic dissuasive fine 
will deter the formation of cartels whatever their contemplated durations. In reality, we assume in 
deriving our results that a cartel member can defect at any time under the threat of detection and 
prosecution, which is certainly a reasonable assumption. A fine lower than the dynamic dissuasive fine 
will not deter cartel formation, and the observed durations will depend on the probability of detection.  
The formula of the dynamic dissuasive fine obtained in our dynamic model is rather robust. 
First, we define this formula with very conservative assumptions: a deviation is assumed to be barely 
profitable, as the deviation profit πd is set equal to the collusion profit πm; second, the firms are 
assumed to be extremely patient, as δ = 1. Relaxing either of these two assumptions would reduce the 
optimal level of the dissuasive fine. Third, we assume that following a deviation, collusion can never 
be achieved again; relaxing this assumption would increase the probability of deviation and therefore 
of instability of the cartel, thereby allowing a reduction in the dissuasive fine. Fourth, we assume that 
deviating firms do not pay the fine even if the cartel is detected at that time; relaxing this assumption 
would reduce the incentive to deviate, thereby justifying an increase of the dissuasive fine. 33 However, 
the increase in the fine would be relatively low, namely by a factor 1 / (1 )α−  (that is, if the 
probability of detection is assumed to be α=15%, the fine increase would be about 18%), but this is 
negligible as soon as the deviation profit becomes significantly higher than the collusion profit, or the 
discount factor is lower than 1.34 Fifth, our analysis can be extended straightforwardly to 
comprehensive concepts of dissuasive fine, defined as the monetary equivalent of all penalties 
including  financial sanctions on corporations and individuals as well as personal sanctions such as 
debarment and prison terms for individuals, and illicit profits, defined as including harm to the 
economy in general.   
Harrington (2004) develops a more complex dynamic model of cartel stability. He models the 
sanction as the sum of a fixed fine and damages, which are proportional to the (present and past) 
                                                            
33 A deviating firm can still be fined for its participation in the cartel when, for instance, communication prior to 
the price-setting stage (for instance, records of the firm’s participation to previous meetings) provides evidence 
(the “smoking gun”) of participation to the agreement: see Harrington (2004) or Aubert, Rey and Kovacic 
(2006). Note that, integrating our two conservative assumptions (deviation profit equal to the collusion profit, 
and firms infinitely patient) in the model of Aubert, Rey and Kovacic (2006), in absence of a leniency program, 
would yield the same dissuasive fine than ours. 
34 Note also that, if price variations increased the suspicion of the antitrust authorities (as in Harrington 2004), a 
price war would increase the risk of detection and fine: in that case, if the deviating firm is fined, the incentive to 
deviate is actually reduced: hence the importance of establishing leniency programs in that case. 
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welfare losses caused by the cartel.35 The damages are cumulative: the amount of damages to be paid 
if the cartel is detected is the sum of the welfare loss in the current period (possibly multiplied by a 
given factor) plus the damages in the previous periods, discounted to take account of the difficulty to 
evaluate past welfare losses. With a constant per-period probability of detection, damages grow over 
time and the collusive payoff is declining at a faster rate than is the deviation payoff. Hence the cartel 
becomes less stable and has to lower its prices to avoid deviations.  
Along similar lines, Hinloopen (2006) computes the optimal fine in a model that allows the 
probability of detection to vary across periods: “[fines] and detection probabilities appear to be 
substitutable instruments as an increase in either reduces [the prospect for cartels]. At the same time 
the two instruments are complementary in that an increase in prospective fine payments yields more 
effect the higher are per-period detection probabilities”.36 This analysis can be useful as we may 
expect that the annual probability of detection of a cartel increases over the cartel lifetime. One reason 
for this is that leniency programs are more attractive as the cartel duration increases. 
4.3 Effectiveness of a restitution fine policy 
The previous analysis suggests that what is traditionally known as the restitution fine may 
actually be dissuasive in a dynamic context, at least after some time. In this section, we gauge the 
efficiency of a policy of inflicting the restitution fine to any convicted cartel. To this end, suppose a 
cartel has been going on for n years and is contemplating to go on for one more year. During this 
additional year, this cartel will be detected with probability α and, if detected and imposed the 
restitution fine, it will pay [( 1) ]n π+ Δ  or a percentage  ([( 1) ] / )n Sπ+ Δ of its annual sales. If it goes 
on one more year, the expected net additional or incremental illicit profit of the cartel is:  
( 1) [1 ( 1)]n nπ α π π αΔ − + Δ = Δ − +  
The restitution fine is thus dissuasive if n +1≥1/α . If the annual probability of detection is 
15%α = , then the restitution fine becomes dissuasive after six (more precisely 5.67) years as the 
expected net incremental profit of one additional year turns out to be negative: the cartel would 
rationally self-dissolve if not detected. If 20%α = , then the restitution fine becomes dissuasive after 
four years. The restitution fine is therefore too low to be dissuasive for shorter-lived cartels, and far 
above the deterrent level for longer-lived cartels.  
However, in a world where all cartels are stable and not dissolved unless detected, all cartels 
eventually end up being detected if the probability of detection is strictly positive. In such a world, the 
                                                            
35 This model is designed to illustrate the American system of fines. 
36 See also Garoupa (2001). 
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restitution fine ensures that the total illegal profits of all cartels are seized back in the long run 
provided the date of birth and effects of cartels can be correctly assessed.37  
4.4 The role of leniency and compliance programs 
Leniency programs modify the deterrence properties of fines.38 Leniency programs make 
enforcement more effective, but they may also induce collusion since they decrease the cost of 
misbehavior. A leniency program might lead firms to deviate from the cartel agreement, thus reducing 
the duration of cartels and also the cost of investigations if denouncement can be made sufficiently 
truthful. However, a leniency program also reduces the expected cost of anticompetitive behavior, and 
may thereby increase the ex-ante incentives of firms to participate in a cartel. However, if the program 
is optimally chosen by a competition authority, the former effect dominates and the leniency program 
improves welfare.39 In that vein, some researchers have considered the possibility of rewarding 
whistle-blowers in leniency programs, thus increasing individual incentives to deviate and reducing 
the cartel stability. For instance, Aubert, Rey and Kovacic (2006) argue that rewarding firms or even 
individual informants for denouncing cartels, including firm employees, can deter collusion in a more 
effective way. 
A question of interest is whether a commitment to antitrust compliance within a company 
should be used as mitigating factor. As acknowledged by Wils (2006), “If they reflect a genuine 
commitment to antitrust compliance at the highest levels within the company, and are well-designed, 
compliance programmes can no doubt be very useful both to prevent antitrust violations and to detect 
such violations as early as possible.” Hence, the use of compliance programs as attenuating factors is 
a priori justified by the argument that they contribute to the reduction of the harm caused to society by 
cartels. However, promising fine reductions to firms that introduce a compliance program would 
reduce ex ante the deterrent effect of the fine. Perhaps, using the absence of a credible compliance 
program as an aggravating factor might be more efficient in deterring competition infringements.  
 
5. The Optimal Level of Fines 
So far, we have provided a theoretical discussion of the optimal characteristics of fines in 
cartel cases. The next step is to assess the efficiency of fines actually imposed by Antitrust authorities. 
This is obviously a very difficult task. We will base our analysis on the empirical study by Combe and 
                                                            
37 Note however that the interest generated by the illicit profits should be, but usually are not included in the 
fines.  
38 Note that the number of cartels convicted has increased since the introduction of leniency programs. In Europe 
for instance, from 1996 to 2008, 6.25 cartels were convicted on average every year, while this rate was 1.4 per 
year before 1996. 
39 See Motta and Polo (2003). 
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Monnier (2010), which is to our knowledge the first attempt to provide such an assessment. We will 
assess how their results would be modified should their analysis be based on our definition of the 
optimal fine. 
Combe and Monnier (2010) analyze 64 cartels fined by the European Commission from 1975 
(the Preserved Mushrooms cartel) to 2009 (the Marine Hose cartel). Actually, 55 of these cases 
occurred after 2001 that is, at the precise time fines started increasing dramatically. They compared the 
actual fines with their estimates of both the restitution fine and the optimal fine.  The parameters in 
Table 3 are defined on an annual basis and allow the authors to derive two bounds for the cartel annual 
excess profit for each of the 64 cases, depending on the value of the demand elasticity, ε = 2 or ε = 0. 
This annual excess profit is then used to determine benchmarks:40 a lower and higher benchmark for 
the restitution fine, which corresponds to the annual excess profit as a percentage of cartel sales times 
the duration of the cartel; a lower and higher benchmark for the dissuasive fine, which corresponds to 
the two bounds of the restitution fine, as defined above, divided by the annual probability of detection. 
Table 3: Combe and Monnier methodology 
 
Parameters Methodology Indicator 
Cartel overcharge (denoted k) 
Based on Connor and 
Bolotova (2006) or 
authors’ own estimate 
+ 20% for national cartels,          
+ 30% for international ones;    
Direct estimate of price increase in 
12 cases out of 64 
Competitive markup 
(denoted m) 
authors’ own estimate, 
case by case evaluation 
Operating result/turnover of cartel 
members or industry leaders 
(average over 5 years). 
Price elasticity of demand 
(denoted ε) Sensitivity analysis Two extreme values: ε = 0 and ε = 2 
Affected market (denoted S) Direct evaluation from the cases 
Annual turnover of the cartel 
members on the affected geographic 
and product market 
Duration of the cartel 
(denoted n) 
Direct evaluation from 
the cases 
Date of first piece of evidence 
/detection date or natural death of 
the cartel before its detection 
Probability of detection 
(denoted α) 
Based on Bryant and 
Eckart (1991), Combe et 
al (2006) 
 
Probability of 15% 
 
 
They define the restitution fine as the annual excess profit times the duration of the cartel 
(assuming stationary excess profits). As for the dissuasive fine, they define it as the restitutive fine 
divided by the annual probability of detection. While their definition of the restitution fine fits more or 
                                                            
40 The benchmarks which are the most favorable to the industry are obtained with ε = 2. This is referred to as the 
“lower” benchmarks by Combe and Monnier. 
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less in our static framework, their approach to define the dissuasive fine is more questionable. Instead 
of defining their dissuasive fine as the total excess profit over the whole duration of the cartel divided 
by the more appropriate overall n-year probability of detection αn (the overall n-year static dissuasive 
fine), they use total excess profit over the whole duration of the cartel divided by the annual 
probability of detection α1. Table 4 summarizes these various approaches and labels each of them for 
future reference. 
Table 4: Comparing different benchmarks for fines for a given Δπ 
Benchmarks label Definition Relative to F1 Relative to F3 
Restitution fine F1 nΔπ 1 nα /(1 - α)  
Combe and Monnier dissuasive fine F2 nΔπ/α 1/α n /(1 - α)  
Our dynamic dissuasive fine F3 (1 - α) Δπ/α (1−α)/nα 1 
Overall n-year static dissuasive fine F4 nΔπ/αn 1/αn nα / αn(1-α) 
 
In the sample of cases considered by Combe and Monnier, the average duration of cartels is 7.3 years 
and the median is 5.6 years. To put it simply, the order of magnitude in the overstatement of their 
dissuasive fine benchmark (using n=7) with respect to the proper dissuasive fine is F2/F3 = n / (1 - 
α) = 8.2, which increases with both n and α.   
To get an intuitive understanding of the major impact of these different formulations, Graph 1 
gives the relative positioning of each benchmark for 15%α = , a given similar value of Δπ, and the 
dynamic dissuasive fine F3 normalized at 1.  
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For cartel with duration less than 6 years (more precisely for n < 5.67), the dynamic dissuasive 
fine benchmark F3 is above the restitutive fine benchmark F1, while the reverse is true for cartels with 
duration of 6 years and longer. If it is important to satisfy both deterrence and restitution criteria, then 
the fine benchmark could be set at the highest of the two levels: in the example of Graph 1, this 
translates into the use of the dynamic dissuasive fine for cartels whose duration is less than five or six 
years and the restitutive fine for cartels of longer duration. Note that an increase in the probability of 
detection (for instance due to a leniency program) reduces F2, F3 and F4. However, as mentioned 
above the ratio F2/F3 increases. 
For each of the 64 cartels, Combe and Monnier derive lower benchmarks (by taking ε = 2) for 
the restitution and the dissuasive fines associated with their model. They provide a graph depicting the 
position of each cartel indicating whether the fine it was imposed is higher or lower than the respective 
benchmarks. If the position of a fine is above the relevant benchmark, it may be considered as 
restitutive or dissuasive, respectively. The overall conclusion of the authors is that, at best, 50% out of 
the 64 fines lie above the restitution benchmark, while only one out of 64 lies above the dissuasive 
benchmark. 
To make a complete comparison with our own benchmarks, one would need to have their 
detailed database and redo some of the calculations, in particular and most importantly the Δπ 
estimates. Combe and Monnier estimates rely in part on Connor’s works to assert minimal cartel 
overcharge estimates of 20% for domestic cartels and 30% for international cartels. Boyer and 
Kotchoni (2011), using a Connor database, updated but similar otherwise to that used by Connor 
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Graph 1: The various benchmarks as a function of cartel duration 
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F2 Combe and Monnier 
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F4 Overall n‐year static 
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(2010), found maximal cartel overcharge bias-corrected estimates of 12.6% for domestic cartels and 
14.8% for international cartels.41     
In Table 5, assuming a mean cartel overcharge of 13%, we rescaled the range of the 
competitive markup to an interval 17% to 27% instead of a uniform 10% so that the total margin over 
marginal costs remains constant. Table 5 presents the cartel excess profit as a percentage of sales and 
the values of benchmarks F1, F2, F3 and F4 obtained from Table 4. 
This table should be read as follows. Columns are paired: columns 1 and 3 (in italics) 
represent the case with k + m = 40%, while columns 2 and 4 represent the case k + m = 30%. Combe 
and Monnier consider cartel overcharges between 20% and 30% (in line with Connor), while we use a 
uniform cartel overcharge of 13% (in line with Boyer and Kotchoni). But the table allows a full 
comparison of the different cases. Consider the comparison of paired columns 2 and 4. The cartel 
excess profit falls from 12% to 7% of sales (using the calculations of Sidebar 1, as in Combe and 
Monnier)42 when the cartel overcharge goes from 20% to 13%. The Combe and Monnier dissuasive 
fine F2, together with the assumed 20% mean cartel overcharge estimate (column 2), reaches 465% of 
annual affected sales, while our dynamic dissuasive fine F3, together with our assumed mean cartel 
overcharge estimate of 13%, reaches 40% of annual affected sales. The Combe and Monnier 
dissuasive fine F2, together with our 13% mean cartel overcharge estimate (column 4), would reach 
279% of annual affected sales, while our dynamic dissuasive fine F3, together with their assumed 
mean cartel overcharge estimate of 20%, would reach 66% of annual affected sales. Our dynamic 
dissuasive fine F3, together with our mean cartel overcharge estimate, is therefore more than 10 times 
lower than the Combe and Monnier dissuasive fine F2, with their assumed mean cartel overcharge 
estimate (both appear in bold in Table 5).  
  
                                                            
41 Boyer and Kotchoni (2011) controls for heterogeneity, asymmetry, outliers and sample selection problems that 
are inherent to the raw overcharge estimates data. 
42 As mentioned before, Sidebar 1 is taken from Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) who do not condone its use 
when a leniency program is in place. They write: “... this standard methodology is appropriate when there is no 
effective leniency program in place, but it gives misleading results when such a program is in place, such as in 
the US after 1993 and in the EU after 1996.” Our approach described above in Figure 2 and Sidebar 3 does not 
rest on the existence of such a leniency program insofar as a deviation by one firm may occur without the cartel 
being revealed or detected.   
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Table 5: Comparison of the various benchmarks (with demand elasticity ε = 2) 
 
Parameters 
With  
Combe and Monnier
cartel overcharge 
With  
Boyer and Kotchoni  
cartel overcharge 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
cartel 
overcharge k  30%  20%  13%  13% 
 
competitive 
markup m 
10%  10%  27%  17% 
 
Excess profit  
as a percentage 
of sales 
(Buccirossi and 
Spagnolo) 
13%  12%  5%  7% 
 
Annual 
probability of 
detection 
15%  15%  15%  15% 
 
cartel duration 
(years) 
6  6  6  6 
Fines as % of 
annual sales 
Restitution F1  76%  70%  29%  42% 
C&M    
dissuasive F2  503% 465%  196%  279% 
Our dynamic 
dissuasive F3 
71%  66%  28%  40% 
Overall n‐year 
dissuasive F4 
121%  112%  47%  67% 
 
We can consider similarly the paired columns 1 and 3. The cartel excess profit falls from 13% 
to 5% of sales when the cartel overcharge goes from 30% to 13%. The Combe and Monnier dissuasive 
fine F2 together with their assumed 30% mean cartel overcharge estimate (column 1) reaches 503% of 
annual sales, while our dynamic dissuasive fine F3 together with our assumed mean cartel overcharge 
estimate of 13% reaches 28% of annual sales. Hence, our dynamic dissuasive fine F3 together with our 
mean cartel overcharge estimate is about 18 times lower than the Combe and Monnier dissuasive fine 
F2 with their assumed mean cartel overcharge estimate (both appear underlined in Table 5).43 
                                                            
43 Assuming a lower probability of detection (say 5%, a very pessimistic assumption compared to the average 
15% assumption in the literature) increases the level of all fines, except the restitution fine F1. However, the 
ratio between F2 and F3 remains in the same range. Considering the comparison of paired columns 2 and 4, 
where the total markup of the cartel is assumed to be 40%, the Combe and Monnier dissuasive fine F2, together 
with their assumed 20% mean cartel overcharge estimate (a case similar to column 2), reaches 1394% of the 
annual affected sales, while our dynamic dissuasive fine F3, together with our assumed mean cartel overcharge 
estimate of 13%, reaches 133% of annual affected sales, that is approximately 10 times lower than F2. We can 
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If we consider the value of the demand elasticity used by Combe and Monnier to define their 
maximal benchmarks (ε = 0) for which less than 19% of fines meet the restitutive benchmark and none 
of them meet the dissuasive benchmark, then Table 6 presents the cartel excess profit as a percentage 
of sales and the values of F1, F2, F3 and F4 over the values of the parameters. The structure of the 
table is the same as that of previous table.  
Considering paired columns 2 and 4 in Table 6, we observe that our dynamic dissuasive fine 
F3 together with our assumed cartel overcharge is more than 10 times lower than the Combe and 
Monnier dissuasive fine F2 together with their assumed cartel overcharge (both appear in bold in 
Table 6). Similarly, if we consider paired columns 1 and 3, we observe that our dynamic dissuasive 
fine F3 together with our assumed cartel overcharge is more than 14 times lower than the Combe and 
Monnier dissuasive fine F2 together with their assumed cartel overcharge (both appear underlined in 
Table 6). 
Another way of looking at our results is as follows: we recommend dissuasive fine levels 
ranging from 28% to 65% of annual sales, while Combe and Monnier would recommend dissuasive 
fine levels ranging from 465% to 923% of annual sales. These values are of course contingent on the 
parameters used in the analysis. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
consider similarly the paired columns 1 and 3, where the total cartel markup is 30%. F2 reaches approximately 
15 times the annual sales, while our dynamic dissuasive fine F3 reaches 0.93 times the annual sales: the ratio is 
about 16. By contrast, increasing the probability of detection reduces the amount of fines F2, F3 and F4 and 
increases the ratio: assuming annual probability of detection of 25% yields the following figures: for columns 2 
and 4, F2=372% and F3=21% (a ratio of 17), and for columns 1 and 3, F2=400% and F3=15% (a ratio of 27). 
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Table 6: Comparison of the various benchmark (with demand elasticity ε = 0) 
 
Parameters 
With  
Combe and Monnier 
cartel overcharge  
With  
Boyer and Kotchoni  
cartel overcharge 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
cartel 
overcharge k  30%  20%  13%  13% 
 
competitive 
markup m 
10%  10%  27%  17% 
 
Excess profit as 
a percentage of 
sales 
(Buccirossi and 
Spagnolo) 
23%  17%  12%  12% 
 
Annual 
probability of 
detection 
15%  15%  15%  15% 
 
cartel duration 
(years) 
6  6  6  6 
Fines as % of 
annual sales 
Restitution F1  138%  100%  69%  69% 
C&M   
dissuasive F2  923% 667%  460%  460% 
Dynamic 
dissuasive F3 
131%  94%  65%  65% 
Overall n‐year 
dissuasive F4 
222%  161%  111%  111% 
 
In the following graphs we compare the results of Combe and Monnier with these revised 
benchmarks respectively for the restitution and (dynamic) dissuasive fines. The graphs correspond to 
the lower benchmarks of Combe and Monnier (ε = 2). To be precise, following our approach, each 
point representing a given cartel on the graph would be repositioned upwards, most of the time by a 
significant factor, typically (but not necessarily) of between 10 and 14. But this would require an 
access to their database as well as some corrections we would like to make to their calculations of the 
but-for competitive mark-ups, which would typically increase the mark-ups for the reasons discussed 
above and therefore reduce the cartel overcharge estimates. Alternatively, we can apply a reduction of 
the benchmark lines to account for the significantly reduced restitutive and dissuasive benchmarks that 
our results suggest. Although this approach is not as rigorous as the alternative, it will most likely give 
very similar results.        
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Graph 2 (Combe and Monnier): 
The position of the 64 cartel cases relative to the benchmarks 
 
 
 
The ratio of fines which are above the restitution fine benchmark increases from 50% to 65% 
if we use a reduction factor of 2 (conservative). If we use an overall overstatement factor of 10 
(conservative), the ratio of fines which are above the dissuasive fine benchmark increases from 1.5% 
to 56%. If we were to use a less conservative correction factor, the percentage of fines that would end 
up above the restitution benchmark and the deterrence benchmark respectively would of course 
increase, possibly significantly.    
 
Factor 1/2
Factor 1/10
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6. Conclusion 
The current orientation of antitrust authorities is to give more importance to deterrence when 
applying cartel fines. There are a number of potential traps one should avoid in determining dissusive 
fines, such as: first, using the Lerner index as a short-cut for the excess profit, thus neglecting both the 
existence of a competitive mark-up (i.e. a but-for price different than the marginal cost) and the 
demand elasticity (note that the Folz report44 strongly invites the antitrust authority to use the demand 
elasticity); second, confusingly applying a static model to define a benchmark for dissuasive fines, 
such as dividing the cartel excess profit over the cartel duration by the annual probability of detection; 
at the very least one should divide the cumulative illicit profits by the overall n-year probability of 
detection over that duration.  
We showed that a proper dynamic analysis of cartel stability suggests using as a dissuasive 
fine benchmark the annual excess profit  times the annual probability of not being detected divided by 
the annual probability of being detected. This analysis has been developed in the context of so-called 
“repeated games”, while taking very conservative views such as taking the static equlibrium as the 
competitive outcome and considering very patient firms. In some industries, with a significant level of 
market concentration, the competitive outcome could be closer to the collusive equilibrium than to the 
static equilibrium. In such cases one would need to develop dynamic models to grasp the specificities 
of these industries. 
The co-existence of two possible objectives such as restitution and deterrence may create 
confusion in setting fines. The idea that restitution fine are not dissuasive has been used as an 
argument in favor of increasing fines above recent levels. This argument is clearly incorrect as soon as 
the duration of the cartel exceeds about 5 or 6 years. Over such duration restitution fines are over-
deterrent.  
The most effective and politically acceptable policy might be to set the fines at the highest of 
the two values: the dynamic dissuasive fine F3 and the restitutive fine F1. In the example of Graph 1, 
this translates into the use of the dynamic dissuasive fine benchmark for cartels whose duration is less 
than five or six years (more precisely 5.67 years) and the restitutive fine benchmark for cartels of 
longer duration.  
We have shown that the dissuasive benchmark measured by Combe and Monnier (2010) 
should be reduced by a factor no smaller than 10. This suggests that, considering the sample of 64 
cartels studied by Combe and Monnier, 65% of the fines imposed by the European Commission in 
                                                            
44 Folz, Raysseguier and Schaub (2010), Rapport sur l’appréciation de la sanction en matière de pratiques 
anticoncurrentielles. 
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recent years are above the properly defined restitutive benchmark and 56% of them are above the 
properly defined dissuasive benchmark. 
More generally the determination of dissuasive fines should be done in the perspective of 
selecting the best combination of policy instruments. For instance, leniency programs must form an 
integral part of the analysis of cartel stability: a proper leniency program is likely to increase the 
probability of detection and conviction (hence making the overstament of F2 with respect ot F3 even 
more problematic), and as such would allow a reduction in dissuasive fine levels. 
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